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Abstract
Individuals’ choices of educational content are often shaped by the political econ-
omy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various skills. We
first present a model to show how differences in educational content emerge as an equi-
librium outcome of private decisions and government policy choices. We then illus-
trate these dynamics in two historical circumstances. In medieval Europe, states and the
Church found individuals trained in Roman law valuable, and eventually supported in-
vestments in this new form of human capital. This had positive effects on Europe’s com-
mercial and institutional development. In late 19th-century China, elites were afraid
of the introduction of Western science and engineering and continued to select civil
servants—who enjoyed substantial rents—based on their knowledge of Confucian clas-
sics. As a result, China lacked skills useful in modern industry. Finally, we present a
variety of other contemporary and historical applications of this theory.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long viewed education as an important determinant of economic devel-
opment and growth.1 Most analyses have focused on broad education quantities: years of
schooling, enrollment rates, and school construction. Much less attention has been paid to
the importance of different types of educational content to a country’s economic develop-
ment.2
Individuals investing in human capital often have a choice among several types of con-
tent; for example, at the tertiary level of education individuals can choose to study law,
business, the humanities, the natural sciences, or engineering, among other subjects (subject
to financial, and other, constraints). At the individual level, different types of educational
content are associated with different skills acquired, different productivity levels across eco-
nomic sectors, and different labor market outcomes. At more aggregate levels, different
skills present in the population can make some sectors of the economy more successful than
others, and can help determine a country’s rate and direction of technical change, either
through the adoption of existing technology or through innovation.
We go beyond previous work by considering the role that governments play in shaping
incentives to acquire different forms of human capital. Governments (and elites more gen-
erally) have an interest in the content of schooling because it plays a role in determining
the quality and stability of political institutions: government administrations rely, directly
and indirectly (e.g., through the raising of revenues), on particular forms of human capi-
tal. Also, political participation of various sorts—including political protest—may depend
on people’s specific types of human capital: the content of people’s education can support
1See Easterlin (1981); Mankiw et al. (1992); Benhabib and Spiegel (1994); Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
Review articles by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) summarize the existing
evidence on the effects of education on growth rates.
2Some examples of papers that widen the scope of analysis are Aghion et al. (2009), Jones (2011), and Algan
et al. (2011).
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seated governments, but also threaten them.3
In this work, we argue that individuals’ investments in different forms of human capital
are important to economic development, and that these investments are often shaped by the
political economy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various
skills. Just as the provision of schools and teachers is an outcome of political economic
forces and affects development, so are the structure of educational institutions in a society
and the costs and benefits of investing in particular forms of human capital.4 On the one
hand, private investment incentives may be sub-optimal, especially when a new form of
human capital becomes available; in this case, governments might subsidize investment in
new, productive skills, pushing investment toward the socially optimal level. On the other
hand, governments or elites may choose to discourage investment in productive forms of
human capital: new forms of human capital could empower new classes of individuals;
lead to political pressure on the seated government; or, draw investment away from skills
the government needs to function.5
Looking across countries today, there is enormous variation in the specific forms of hu-
man capital acquired.6 UNESCO data show that the fraction of college and university stu-
dents studying social science, business or law ranges from 14.4% in Saudi Arabia to 58.2%
in Bahrain; the fraction studying engineering ranges from 1% in Congo to 31.9% in South
Korea (see Figure 1 and Table 1).7 Whether these differences arise because the most produc-
3Governments also have a stake in the content of education because education serves as a channel through
which government can shape ideology. See Clots-Figueras and Masella (2009); Friedman et al. (2011).
4See, for example, Engerman et al. (1999); Acemoglu and Robinson (2008); Naidu (2010).
5Glaeser et al. (2004), among others, emphasize the role human capital plays in shaping political institutions.
6Our focus in on tertiary education here, though variation in content also exists at the secondary school
level (e.g., education systems in many countries include academic and vocational tracks), and even earlier (e.g.,
religious versus secular education at the primary school level).
7The data from which these statistics are calculated are described in A. Even within OECD countries, these
differences are sizeable: the share of enrollments in business or law varies between 48.8% (Turkey) and 21%
(South Korea), whereas the share of enrollments in engineering is lowest in New Zealand (6.5%) and highest in
South Korea (31.9%).
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tive type of human capital is acquired in each country is not obvious a priori; this would be
the case if engineers were very productive in countries where engineers are trained, while
lawyers were especially productive in countries training many lawyers, and so on.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Table 1 about here]
The purpose of this paper is to show how differences in educational content emerge as an
equilibrium outcome—possibly far from being socially optimal—of both private decisions
to invest in different forms of human capital and government policy choices that affect the
costs and benefits of acquiring different skills; we then link investments in different forms
of human capital to historical and contemporary growth experiences.
This political economy nexus, we argue, remains relevant in understanding the current
choices facing governments in developing countries. As an example, consider the shortage
of (native-born) business managers in China since the economic reforms, and continuing
into recent years, an issue discussed by Lane and Pollner (2008), among others. On the
one hand, the Chinese government is clearly concerned about promoting economic growth,
and so might wish to encourage training in business schools. On the other hand, the ruling
Communist Party might wish to suppress modern business education: the Party could face
ideological challenges from individuals trained in Western-style business courses that cer-
tainly do not tend to emphasize either communism or nationalism; in addition, the Chinese
civil service must compete with private firms for top talent, and might prefer that the best
students study fields more relevant to public administration. It appears that, in the eyes of
the Chinese government, the benefits of allowing the study of Western management prac-
tices outweigh the potential threats to existing elites: the flourishing of modern business
schools in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and elsewhere in recent years is evidence of the
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Party’s stance on investments in this specific form of human capital today.
We follow other economists in pointing to government institutions and elites’ incentives
as important ultimate sources of variation in human capital.8 However, we emphasize a
particular policy channel that has not received a great deal of study: governments choose
the structure of educational institutions and shape the content of education within those
institutions. Importantly, the government’s views on human capital acquisition will depend
on the type of human capital being produced in a society’s educational institutions, and on
elites’ expected payoffs from people’s investments in various skills.
To clarify government’s role in shaping the incentives to invest in different types of hu-
man capital, in Section 2 of this paper we present a simple model in which an individual
chooses whether to invest in a new form of educational content, in an environment in which
the government can subsidize or tax this investment.9 Individuals face some private cost
of acquiring a new form of human capital; an important component of the cost of, and ex-
pected return to, the individual’s investment is government policy toward the new form of
human capital. Governments might value investments in productive forms of human capi-
tal because they generate higher incomes, and so higher expected tax revenues; in addition,
new human capital may affect the probability that the seated government remains in power,
either negatively or positively.10 In general, governments will trade off their desire to grow
the economy against their potential loss of power in choosing an optimal tax or subsidy for
the new educational content. The theoretical discussion suggests that, if governments are
threatened by economic change, they will act to stifle investment in new skills, with adverse
consequences for growth.
8See, for example, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005).
9The role of elites in the decision to provide education is discussed, among others, by Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2000), and Galor and Moav (2006).
10Novel forms of human capital may threaten existing elites’ rents and thus be destabilizing. However, it is
also conceivable that new forms of knowledge may serve to bolster existing regimes: they could improve the
effectiveness of the military or the bureaucracy, or simply be ideologically effective.
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We next illustrate these predictions through two historical case studies in Sections 3
and 4: medieval Europe, which witnessed the creation of the first modern universities, and
late imperial China, where a “traditional” system of education was slowly replaced by a
more modern curriculum that introduced the study of Western science and engineering.
Both cases make clear the role—both promoting and retarding—played by governments in
individuals’ investments in new forms of human capital.
In medieval Europe, Roman law was studied in the world’s first universities beginning
in the 11th century, following the “rediscovery” of Justinian’s Code. States (both secular
and religious) found individuals who had studied law valuable, and generally supported
investments in this new form of human capital, for example by granting privileges to uni-
versities and their students. Employment in secular and Church administrations increased
the labor market returns to legal study. These implicit subsidies paid off: lawyers trained at
universities reduced the uncertainty of, and obstacles to, trade across Europe’s then highly-
fragmented states.
In 19th century China, encounters with Western powers brought the study of Western
science and engineering into some Chinese schools. For centuries, civil service exams based
on the Confucian Classics had selected China’s social and political elite; dismantling the
traditional education system was perceived as a severe threat by those elites. Consequently,
they preserved strong social and economic incentives to study traditional content. As a
result, for much of the 19th century, the study of Western subjects was limited; China lacked
skills useful in modern industry, and experienced limited economic development.
We bring the hypotheses resulting from our model to other cases in Section 5. First, we
discuss a variety of historical and contemporary applications of our theory. These examples
show how the political economy dimension of governments’ policies toward different forms
of educational content, either to promote growth, or to secure the positions of elites, is rele-
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vant to many different places and time periods. Second, using correlational evidence from
cross-country data over the last decade, we show that curricular choices are associated with
different income growth rates, and that this relationship is mediated by a country’s political
institutions.11 We interpret these findings in the light of our theory. In Section 6 we discuss
our results, and offer concluding thoughts.
2 A Model of the Study of New Educational Content
2.1 Setup and Actors
Suppose that a representative individual can, at some cost, invest in a new form of human
capital.12 In expectation, the new human capital increases his income, but the actual realiza-
tion of the productivity of the new skill is uncertain ex ante. He chooses his investment level
to maximize expected after-tax income, less the cost of investing in human capital.
The other player in the model is “the state” (or “government”), which we assume to be
a unitary actor representing a seated government elite. The goal of this elite is to maximize
tax revenues, subject to the need to remain in power in order to enjoy those revenues. Indi-
viduals’ investments in the new skill affect the state through two channels: first, because the
state taxes income, greater private incomes will (ceteris paribus) increase state tax revenues.
Second, greater quantities of the new skill affect the likelihood that the existing state retains
11The association between specific human capital content on growth was first examined by Murphy et al.
(1991), who found that countries with more engineering students grew more quickly on average between 1970
and 1985, while countries with more students studying law grew more slowly. The investigation of “misallo-
cations of talent”—this being the term coined by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny—was readily picked up by the
literature on endogenous growth theory (Jones, 1995; Romer, 2001). Krueger and Kumar (2004) and Vanden-
bussche et al. (2006) discuss the growth effects, depending on a country’s distance to the technological frontier,
of educational types favoring innovation or imitation.
12The model we present here can apply more generally to individuals’ decisions of whether to increase their
investments in an existing form of human capital, or to individuals’ choices among different forms of human
capital that already exist. Our discussion here focuses on new forms of human capital to match the circum-
stances of the historical cases we study below.
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its power. More individuals studying the new educational content might support the ex-
isting state: these individuals could be productively employed in the bureaucracy, in the
military, etc. On the other hand, individuals who study the new content might threaten the
existing state, for example, because a new class of individuals gets money and influence, or
because educated individuals might be more likely to revolt.13
To simplify the model, we assume that the tax rate on income is fixed, and that the state’s
only policy instrument is a “distortion” in the market for human capital. This distortion
might come from regulations restricting (or encouraging) the teaching of new educational
content, or from a state’s choice to preferentially hire individuals without (or with) the new
human capital.14 States can thus raise or lower individuals’ costs of acquiring the new form
of human capital.15 We assume that any distortion, whether promoting or retarding the
study of the new content, has a direct cost to the state.
An individual’s investment in a new form of human capital is the (subgame perfect)
equilibrium outcome of a game between a representative individual and the state, the timing
of which is as follows:
• The state acts first, choosing a distortion, δ∗, in the market for the new form of human
capital, looking ahead toward the individual’s optimal investment decision given the
chosen distortion. The distortion may increase or decrease the individual’s cost of
acquiring a unit of the new form of human capital (positive values of δ indicate a
subsidy).
13Another conceivable channel (not analyzed here) would link human capital to the likelihood that the elite
maintains power through changes in income.
14In practice, governments act to distort the private costs and benefits of studying particular fields in many
ways. They produce education and subsidize its production and consumption; they help coordinate invest-
ments in education; and, they affect the labor market returns to the study of various fields, either through direct
hiring, or through various interventions in product and labor markets (e.g., “industrial policy”).
15We load all of the state’s distortions onto the cost term in the individual’s objective function, though, of
course, in reality both costs and expected benefits are affected by state policies.
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• The individual then chooses his level of investment, h∗, in the new form of human
capital to maximize his expected earnings, less costs. Greater levels of investment
increase individual income, but come at a cost (which depends on the state’s policy
choice in the previous stage).
• Nature then determines the productivity of the new skill, and whether the existing
government remains in power (the latter a function of the individual’s investment in
the new form of human capital).
The game is solved via backwards induction.
2.2 The Individual’s Optimization Problem
The individual’s problem is straightforward: taking the tax rate on income (τ ∈ [0, 1]) and
the government’s distortion of the cost of education (δ∗ ∈ [−δ, δ]) as given, the individual
maximizes his expected income y, less the cost of the new form of human capital:
max
h
E[(1− τ)y(h)− (1− δ∗)c(h)] (1)
subject to:
y(h) = A f (h), fh > 0, fhh < 0 (2)
A ∼ U[1− eA, 1+ eA] (3)
ch > 0, chh > 0. (4)
That is, the individual chooses h∗ to maximize:
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∫ 1+eA
1−eA
(1− τ)A f (h)dA− (1− δ∗)c(h). (5)
The first order condition, which implicitly defines the individual’s optimal choice, h∗, is:
fh(h∗) =
(1− δ∗)
(1− τ) ch(h
∗). (6)
From the first order condition, one can easily see that higher tax rates and higher costs
of investing in the human capital are associated with lower investment levels:
∂h∗
∂ch
< 0 (7)
∂h∗
∂τ
< 0. (8)
Most importantly for the game,
∂h∗
∂δ∗
> 0. (9)
The individual’s optimal level of investment in the new form of human capital is simply
an increasing function of δ∗.16
It is of interest to consider the case when δ∗ = 0, that is, when there is no government
distortion of the cost of studying the new educational content. In this case, given our as-
sumption of expected income maximization by the individual, investment in the new form
of human capital would be socially optimal. Of course, if the individual maximizes utility,
and his utility function is a strictly concave function of income, it will not generally true that
investment chosen by the representative individual will be the level chosen by a risk-neutral
16Our discussion here assumes well-behaved individual and state objective functions as well as interior values
of the optimal human capital choice and optimal distortion. The various functional form assumptions made
above (risk-neutrality, uniformly distributed productivity of human capital, etc.) are not necessary to derive our
results; they are made for ease of exposition.
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social planner.17 Because of the uncertain realization of the actual productivity of the new
form of human capital, risk-averse individuals will tend to under-invest in the new form of
human capital. The more uncertain is the return to the new skill, the less the individual will
invest, even if the expected return is very high. If the model included positive externalities
from an individual’s investment, or if there were strategic complementarities in individu-
als’ investment decisions, there would be additional reason to think that the representative
individual would under-invest in the new skill in the absence of government intervention.18
Private under-investment in human capital (relative to the social optimum) depends on
the uncertainty of the returns to the new form of human capital; on the degree of comple-
mentarity among individuals’ investments; and on the positive externalities (if any) arising
from individuals’ investments. Such under-investment implies a role for the state to play in
encouraging investment in new forms of human capital. Of course, the mechanisms used to
encourage investment can also be deployed to discourage it.
2.3 The Government’s Problem
The government will choose an optimal distortion δ∗ to maximize the expected revenues
it will enjoy. Revenues are not certain because the existing government may be deposed;
the government remains in power with probability pi(h∗) ∈ [0, 1]. Because we focus on
subgame-perfect equilibria, we assume that the government (correctly) anticipates the opti-
mal investment response h∗ of the representative individual to any choice of δ.
Thus, plugging in the expected value of A in the production function, the government
chooses δ∗ to maximize the following:
17We assume that the social planner does not consider the state’s objectives, but does take the tax rate on
income as given.
18Although evidence in favor of large externalities to education is scarce (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos,
2004, or Pritchett, 2001), education has been found to affect a wide range of social outcomes (for a review, see
McMahon, 2004). Also see Jones (2011) on the importance of coordination in human capital investment choices
and growth.
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max
δ
pi(h∗(δ)) · τ · f (h∗(δ)) + [1− pi(h∗(δ))] · 0− d(δ) (10)
where d(δ) is the cost to the elite of implementing a distortion δ. We assume that the function
d(δ) is continuously differentiable on the set
[−δ, δ] and has the following properties:
d(δ) > 0, (11)
d′(δ) < 0 if δ < 0, d′(δ) > 0 if δ > 0, (12)
d(0) = 0. (13)
The first order condition, which implicitly defines the optimal level δ∗, is as follows:
τ ·
[
pi(h∗(δ∗)) · ∂ f
∂h∗
· ∂h
∗
∂δ
+ · f (h∗(δ∗)) · ∂pi
∂h∗
· ∂h
∗
∂δ
]
=
∂d
∂δ
. (14)
Suppose the government considers a small increase of δ∗ from a value of zero, thus
inducing a higher level of human capital investment by the individual. This will affect the
government’s payoffs through three channels. First, this increase in human capital will be
reflected in expected income ( ∂ f∂h∗ · ∂h
∗
∂δ > 0), and thus expected tax revenues raised. Second,
the increased human capital affects the likelihood that the existing state remains in power by
the time the higher revenues are collected ( ∂pi∂h∗ · ∂h
∗
∂δ ); in principle, higher levels of investment
could either increase or decrease the probability that the existing government remains in
power. Finally, the state weighs these two effects against the direct cost from its distortion
of the market for human capital ( ∂d∂δ ).
There are two cases to consider: first, suppose the new form of human capital supports
the seated government: pih ≡ ∂pi∂h∗ ≥ 0. In this case, the state simply weighs the advantages of
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a higher δ∗—greater revenue due to higher incomes and a higher probability of remaining
in power to enjoy the revenue—against the direct cost of the distortion of the market for
human capital. In this case, δ∗ will be (weakly) positive, and individual investment will be
(equal to or) greater than what it would have been without the government distortion. In a
model in which individuals’ private incentives are insufficient to generate socially optimal
investment, the government’s choice of subsidy in this case will move investment levels
toward the social optimum.19
In the second case, the new form of human capital threatens the seated government:
pih < 0. In this case, it is ambiguous whether the government will subsidize or tax invest-
ment in the new form of human capital. It weighs the benefit of a positive δ∗—greater tax
revenues received if the government remains in power—against the costs: now, both a de-
creased likelihood of remaining in power and a direct cost of distortion (see equation (14)).
The greater is the threat—the more negative is pih—the more likely is the state to choose
a low, even negative, value for δ∗. Consequently, when the seated government is severely
threatened by the accumulation of a new form of human capital, investments in the new
skill, and income levels, will be lower than they would be in the absence of the government
policy—perhaps far below the social optimum.
In the equilibrium of the game, the government chooses δ∗ according to equation (14);
the individual then chooses his best response, taken from equation (6).20 Payoffs are finally
determined by nature’s draw of the productivity of human capital and whether the state
remains in power.
19Of course, investment levels could be greater than would be socially optimal in this case, depending on the
level of the subsidy chosen, and depending on externalities, among other issues.
20Assuming well-behaved, continuously differentiable functional forms, with closed, bounded domain and
range, there will exist optimal strategies for the government and the individual.
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3 Historical Case Study 1: Roman Law and Universities in Me-
dieval Europe
The theoretical framework just outlined suggests that new forms of human capital may be
acquired sub-optimally, and that government policy can play an important role determining
how much of a new form of human capital will be acquired. In this and the following section
we examine two historical instances in which new forms of human capital became available.
In both cases, governments played critical roles in determining whether and how much of
the new human capital would be accumulated, with important consequences for economic
development.
3.1 Roman Law as New Educational Content
The high Middle Ages saw a resurgence of economic activity in Europe. New cities were
founded, old cities grew, the volume and the scope of trade expanded and reached new
heights, both at the local level and across the continent. Not only was the economy burgeon-
ing, states also began to take on modern forms, by centralizing the monopoly of violence
and clearly attributing elements of power and sovereignty to different layers and actors.
Ultimately, this economic expansion and institutional transformation changed Europe from
a rural backwater (relative to Asia and the Islamic world) into an urban and commercial
continent, arguably setting the stage for the subsequent projection of European domination
across the oceans, and the “Great Divergence” (Lopez, 1976; Postan, 1973; Britnell, 1993;
Epstein, 2000; Buringh and van Zanden, 2009).
Around the same time, in the late 11th and 12th centuries, individuals came to Italy
from across Europe to study the newly “rediscovered” Justinian Code of Roman law under
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the tutelage of legal scholars in private schools.21 Roman law was a distinct, qualitative
improvement over the judicial systems in place up to that point.22 Berman (1983, p. 50)
writes:
[T]he legal rules and procedures which were applied in the various legal orders of the West in
the period prior to the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries were largely undifferentiated from
social custom and from political and religious institutions. No one had attempted to organize
the prevailing laws and legal institutions into a distinct structure. Very little of the law was in
writing. There was no professional judiciary, no professional class of lawyers, no professional
legal literature. Law was not consciously systematized.
Existing systems of law, such as the Germanic ones, thus had a series of drawbacks. First,
they were very local; in a context of highly fragmented polities, this tended to discourage
trade. Second, they were traditionally based on kinship, honor and superstition. As such,
they were not ready to respond to the needs of expanding trade, as opposed to the devel-
oping body of Roman law. Finally, old systems of justice were informal—formal trials were
seldom used; feuds between kin groups often functioned as trial substitutes, and oaths and
trust within and across kin groups played an important role in preventing bloodshed. In
an increasingly complex commercial and institutional environment, such community-based
resolutions to legal disputes were bound to be more difficult to enforce and thus to imple-
ment.
Roman law, instead, was a complex and broad system of legal knowledge. It was a sci-
ence “in which individual legal decisions, rules, and enactments were studied objectively
and were explained in terms of general principles and truths basic to the system as a whole”
(Berman, 1983, p. 120). It was flexible and it could look back on centuries of scholarly dis-
cussion, application, development and refinement. Savigny (1834, vol. 3, p. 86) argues that
21Other locations of scholarly rediscovery of Roman law were Provence, the Lombard cities and Ravenna
(Vinogradoff, 1929, p. 33).
22We do not want to diminish the parallel importance of pre-Roman legal systems or alternative social and in-
stitutional arrangements, such as guilds or the Hanseatic league. We argue that a written, formal, and organized
system of laws had a positive contribution to the outcomes studied here.
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Roman law would have been much less attractive to the scholars and practical men of the
Middle Ages if it had consisted only of Justinian’s Codex. Rather, the Corpus Iuris Civilis also
included the Digest (Pandectae), a rich collection of comments by Roman jurists on the topics
of property rights, obligations, contracts, family and inheritance law, and on criminal law.
Most important, perhaps, was Roman law’s suitability to the needs of an economically
flourishing society.23 Renewed trade and growing cities had created economic opportuni-
ties, and the citizens of Medieval Europe were looking for a legal system to match their
needs. Savigny (1834, vol. 3, p. 84) writes that:
The first and foremost reason [for the reemergence of Roman law] were the needs of Lombard
cities. . . These cities were now extremely rich, populated and active. Their brisk trade and com-
mercial activities required a developed civil law; the Germanic systems of national laws were not
adequate, and the poor knowledge of Roman law that had served its purpose up to then was now
deemed insufficient. The well-preserved sources of this [Roman] law were alone entirely suffi-
cient, and, used properly and in a scholarly way, they could deliver a body of law that matched
these newly emerging needs. [own translation]
More specifically, Berman (1983, p. 245) comments on the status of contract law in the
Roman legal system:24
[T]he older Roman law (especially the ius gentium) had achieved a very high level of sophisti-
cation in the field of contracts, and much of its vocabulary in that field, as well as many of its
solutions to individual questions, could be applied in the twelfth century to the newly burgeoning
commercial life of western Europe.
23Colliva (1977–1999) cites another factor that determined the demand for Roman law. As a consequence of
the constitutio de feudis (an edict issued by the Holy Roman Emperor Conrad II in 1037), all fiefs, including those
of minor nobility, became inheritable. This prompted an increased demand for more legal security, for more
certain jurisdiction, and for a better system of inheritance law, as the minor nobility and gentry of northern Italy
set off to defend their newly acquired privileges against their mostly clerical competitors, who could sustain
their claims through their mastery of the sophisticated body of canon law.
24In the context of the Medieval systems of personal law, Canon law—applicable to clergymen and in trans-
actions with ‘moral’ repercussions—also had a variety of economic applications. Berman (1983, p. 225) writes,
“[T]here gradually developed. . . out of the church’s jurisdiction over testaments, a body of law pertaining to
inheritance; out of the church’s jurisdiction over benefices, a body of law pertaining to property; out of the
church’s jurisdiction over oaths, a body of law pertaining to contracts; out of the church’s jurisdiction over sins,
a body of law pertaining to crimes and torts.”
16
The complementary evolution to the rediscovery of Roman law and Roman legal think-
ing was the development of an educational institution that would teach and disseminate
this body of knowledge. The university, as it emerged from the first societies of scholars and
students in Bologna and other cities (cf. next section), was the result of this evolution. It rep-
resented a novel form of teaching, distinct from the cathedral schools and monastic schools.
While many universities also taught canon law, and many of the students were clergymen
or had at least received the minor orders, the university was a secular institution. Medicine
and civil (Roman) law were the subjects that best embodied this change in the character of
education, and which were from the beginning linked to the new institution.
The needs of a commercial society that had prompted the rediscovery of Roman law
also characterized its teaching at universities. Students wished to study law not as a pas-
time, but for professional purposes: “Medieval legal education was not directed towards the
training of law teachers but of professional legal practitioners” (Ru¨egg, 1992, p. 25). Schol-
arly activity was also concerned with practical aspects: “[T]he twelfth-century glossators of
the Roman law were particularly sophisticated in their reconstruction and transformation
of the older Roman law of contracts, in part just because of the demands placed upon them
in that respect by the rapid economic changes of their time” (Berman, 1983, p. 245).
Training in the law, in Bologna and soon in other universities, attracted thousands of
students each year. Universities quickly spread across Europe, with their charters granted
by Kings, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope. Table 2 evidences this development:
there were no universities in Europe in the 11th century; by the end of the 13th, there were
more than a dozen; by the end of the 14th, the number had more than doubled again.
[Table 2 about here]
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3.2 The Political Economy of University Establishment and of the Adoption of
Roman Law
The law school in Bologna emerged as a “focal point” (Moraw, 1992, p. 247) for the education
of jurists in the 10th century. Masters and their students formed corporations (societates) to
institutionalize the teaching arrangement and defend their rights. However, it was far from
obvious that these corporations would enjoy the support of the Kings, Popes, or even of the
cities they resided in.
As long as the law schools were simply “private and unauthorised teachers” (Rashdall,
1895, vol. 1, p. 145), authorities such as Popes and Kings were not concerned with either
hindering or supporting this new form of study. However, as the importance of the teaching
of law grew and the number of students increased, different approaches became visible.
The Church initially looked at the new institution with suspicion. Universities were a
competitor of cathedral schools and monastic schools—the traditional places where it had
educated its elites up to then. Afraid of losing its monopoly of education, the Church im-
posed a ban on the study of medicine and civil law by monks and canons, particularly since
the schools of medicine and civil law were led by laymen. This ban was issued in the in the
Council of Clermont (1130), and reiterated in the Council of Reims (1131) and in the second
Lateran council of 1139 (Verger, 1977–1999). Cities also had an ambivalent relationship to
the new institution. The presence of a large number of (mainly wealthy) students and teach-
ers was of course attractive; however, the unclear legal status of students was also a source
of ‘town and gown’ conflicts.25
In contrast to this, Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa’s approach to the students of law
reflected his understanding of the usefulness of jurists. In 1155, he met the students of
Bologna just outside the city walls and issued a bill of privileges, the Authentica Habita. With
25For example, a source of conflicts were merchants’ attempts to seize some student’s property to satisfy debts
incurred by his compatriots.
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this constitution, the Emperor granted professors and students freedom of movement for
the purposes of their studies. He also forbade the right of reprisal against foreign scholars,
and decreed that students summoned to court could choose to be tried by their own masters
(teachers) or by the bishops’ courts, rather than by the local courts (Nardi, 1992). To protect
themselves further, early in the 13th century students in Bologna founded “universities” of
students and gave themselves written statutes (Weimar, 1977–1999). These universities re-
placed the societates of students and teachers and were modeled after another self-governing,
successful institution of the Middle Ages: the guild (Rashdall, 1895, vol. 1, p. 152).
The growing importance of jurists and of their specialized knowledge of Roman law in
defining rulers’ powers became clear at the Imperial Diet of Roncaglia (1158), a key moment
in Frederick Barbarossa’s attempts to restore the Imperial powers over Italy. The Emperor
attended the diet accompanied by four legal counsellors from Bologna—Bulgarus, Martinus
Gosia, Iacobus, and Hugo de Porta Ravennate—who provided expert legal advice (Georgi,
1977–1999); in exchange, he confirmed the privileges of Authentica Habita.
As in the case of Frederick Barbarossa, the authorities’ suspicion of the new institution
vanished with the realization of the usefulness of jurists, and of the role of universities as
providers of highly educated graduates to staff the ranks in public and Church administra-
tion (Verger, 1977–1999). Popes, Emperors, and other lords (spiritual and temporal) found
individuals trained in law at university to be extremely valuable: Moraw (1992, p. 247)
writes that
[the universities] made possible the emergence of groups of persons who, as legal experts, occupied
posts of growing importance for the life of society. The communities needed these specialists for
their domestic administration and legal system, in the quest for increasing autonomy and in the
competitive struggle with their neighbors.
By the beginning of the 13th century jurists came to dominate the personnel of the
chanceries of kingdoms such as France or England, as well as of the Church (Swanson,
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1979, p. 15, Nardi, 1992, pp. 92–3).
In sum, the authorities of the epoch contributed to the success of the university, as a novel
institution devoted to the teaching of Roman law in particular, in two ways. On one side,
Popes, Kings, Holy Roman Emperors, and city governments issued privileges and granted
various rights to universities and their students—as in the case of the Authentica Habita,
or of the protection tamquam filios speciales (“like dearly beloved sons”) explicitly accorded
by Pope Honorius III to the students of Paris, who had been harassed by the local bishop
(Nardi, 1992, p. 85).26 The importance of having multiple sponsors for the ultimate success
of a university is shown exemplarily in the cases of Piacenza and of the English universities:
in the first case, Pope Innocent IV had founded a university, but the activities failed to take
hold due to the lack of support of the city. In England, on the other hand, after 1231 King
Henry III confirmed the privileges conceded by the Church to the universities of Oxford and
Cambridge, thus contributing to their development (Nardi, 1992, p. 92).
On the other side, Kings, Emperors, and Popes increased the labor market returns to
university study by hiring graduates of the universities to staff their chanceries and admin-
istrations. In doing this, they clearly signaled to potential students that the university study
was not just an intellectual pastime, but that it taught skills that were valued and that could
eventually be rewarded with prestigious and lucrative positions. As an illustration of the
interest of rulers in universities, one should consider the efforts made by Emperor Frederick
II to create a studium in Naples, both to give prestige to his throne and to train the ruling
class of the kingdom of Sicily. His insistent attempts to poach teachers and students from
26There were, of course, limits to administrative elites’ desire for expanded training at universities: the Church
in the Middle Ages was concerned about heterodox teachings of theology, and at times resisted the chartering
of new universities. This appears to have been one reason why the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire
were without a single university until late in the 14th century. In 1378, a schism left the Church with two
rivaling Popes, one in Rome and one in Avignon, resulting in the Roman Pope’s loss of control over the flagship
theological university at Paris. This led him to grant charters to new universities, among those the ones of
Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt (Nardi, 1992; Swanson, 1979).
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Bologna were ultimately unsuccessful, and only confirmed the Popes’ desire to support the
other universities across Italy and the rest of Europe (Nardi, 1992, pp. 87f., Rashdall, 1895,
vol. 2, pp. 22ff.).
Viewed through the framework of the model above, the historical evidence suggests that
medieval rulers (in particular, the Church) initially perceived the introduction of the new
legal knowledge as threatening (pih < 0). In a later phase, they realized that their positions
could be strengthened by encouraging the study of Roman law (pih > 0). The consolidation
of their power and the increased incomes that new human capital could generate led states
(including the Church) to subsidize investment in the new human capital (δ∗ > 0). The
rights and privileges granted to universities reduced the cost of acquiring education: more
certainty about the legal value of the degrees attained and the elimination of the risk of
being held at ransom by local authorities were factors that diminished the costs faced by
students when choosing an educational path. The secure labor market returns from legal
study by working in secular or Church administrations also increased students’ expected
returns from legal study.
Ultimately, the authorities’ encouragement and support of the new institution, the uni-
versity, and of the study of Roman law in particular, were effective: university training in
the law was widespread in the Middle Ages, and the influence of trained jurists extended
over various realms of public life, from academia to the commercial environment, and to the
administration of Church and secular states.
3.3 The Effects of Legal Studies on Commercial Development
To understand the economic impact of legal studies in the context of the Middle Ages, two
important aspects have to be taken into account. The first is the high number of different
polities. After the collapse of the Carolingian empire, by some accounts the number of poli-
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ties increased from 10 to more than 200 in the year 1300 (Tilly, 1990). Different polities had
different jurisdictions, different customs, and different weights and measures; it was nearly
impossible to prosecute, for example, an insolvent buyer across the borders of territories.
These factors were a severe hindrance to trade, and reputational mechanisms or institutions
such as merchant’s guilds could only partly compensate for the absence of a unitary legal
framework (Greif, 1989, 1993).
The second is the absence, compared to the modern world of nation-states with well-
defined boundaries, of a clear demarcation of the different aspects of sovereignty between
the political actors—Popes, Bishops, Kings or Emperors, local feudal lords, cities etc. In ad-
dition to the multiplication of the number of polities, local lords were trying to extend their
control over the territories they held as fiefs (Bisson, 1994). Different layers of sovereignty,
the competition between secular and Church powers (such as in the investiture conflict),
and between different levels of each power (such as liege lords and vassals) led to a situa-
tion in which “no single power agency controlled a clear-cut territory or the people within
it” (Mann, 1986, p. 386; cited in van Zanden, 2009).
In this context, the introduction of Roman legal knowledge was a useful innovation, con-
tributing to the expansion of urbanization, long-distance trade and small-scale commerce
that characterized—despite the obstacles described above—the high Middle Ages. Thanks
to the sophistication of Roman law in the field of contracts, and the fact that a common le-
gal language was now shared all over Europe (because of the similarity of curricula across
universities), medieval jurists who worked as lawyers, judges, notaries, or procurators sup-
ported the unfolding of commercial activities. Berman (1983, p. 336) writes:
In fact, the new jurisprudence of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries provided a framework
for institutionalizing and systematizing commercial relations in accordance with new concepts
of order and justice. Without such new legal devices as negotiable bills of exchange and limited
liability partnerships, without the reform of the antiquated commercial customs of the past, with-
out mercantile courts and mercantile legislation, other social and economic pressures for change
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would have found no outlet. Thus the commercial revolution helped to produce commercial law,
but commercial law also helped to produce the commercial revolution.
In addition to supporting commercial exchange, jurists played an important role in
public administrations (Berman, 1983, p. 120). Here, again relying on the common, pan-
European framework of Roman law, they could help solve the conflicts of rivaling sovereign-
ties between Church and states, and between secular states. In fact, some of the most pres-
tigious positions for jurists in the Middle Ages were those as counsellors, members of the
chanceries, or envoys of Kings, Emperors, princes or cities. Even in the Church the highest-
ranking appointments were reserved to jurists trained in Roman law, in addition to canon
law (Moraw, 1992, p. 266). Other career paths in the public administration that were open to
jurists trained in Roman law were: solicitors, town clerks, city chroniclers, or notaries—the
latter two occupations could also be taken by students of law who had not completed their
degrees (Wieacker, 1967, p. 159).
One of the earliest examples of jurists reconciling conflicts between polities dates from
the Diet of Roncaglia (1158). Barbarossa’s legal counsellors—together with experts repre-
senting the Lombard cities—drafted a document (Regalia sunt hec) which helped to define
the rights and attributes of Emperors (regalia) as opposed to those of the cities of northern
Italy, also spelling out under which conditions those rights could be devolved to other poli-
ties (Georgi, 1977–1999).
Roman law thus fulfilled the roles that have been identified by the literature (Greif, 2005,
2008a,b; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) as crucial to economic development: it placed con-
straints on rulers, thereby signaling that property rights were secure, provided mechanisms
for contract enforcement, and facilitated coordination among powers.
The evidence on the careers of Medieval jurists is rich.27 We analyzed the biographies
27Different attempts to reconstruct the careers of Medieval graduates of law have been published by Stelling-
Michaud (1960), Martines (1968), and Kuhn (1971). A recent project is the “Repertorium Academicum German-
icum”, available online at http://www.rag-online.org/. Cf. also the survey in Coing (1973), pp. 81ff.
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of over 1,200 graduates of law from the university of Bologna, between its foundation and
the early 17th century. These data, first collected by Alidosi (1623), give insights into the
careers of graduates of the oldest and most distinguished law faculty in Europe.28 In Ta-
ble 3, the career choices of the Bolognese graduates are categorized into four broad areas:
clerical positions in the Church, administrative positions in the Church, academia, and pub-
lic administration. As the data include graduates of canon and Roman law together, the
large number of careers in the Church is not surprising.29 However, jurists’ occupations in
the Church were often related to administrative tasks. At the same time, almost a quar-
ter of graduates went into explicitly secular administrative positions, such as governors or
podesta`—these were professional managers of cities, appointed for one year, taking the place
of aristocratic administrators. They went from city to city together with a small group of
judges, notaries, and secretaries (Moraw, 1992, p. 148; Greif, 1998).
[Table 3 about here]
In a recent working paper (Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2010), we go beyond the analysis of
jurists’ careers and try to investigate the potential aggregate economic effects of Roman law
in Medieval Europe. To solve the endogeneity of the adoption of Roman law—arguably, Ro-
man law re-emerged in the Middle Ages because of the needs of a commercializing society—
we exploit the introduction of universities (and thus of Roman legal thinking) in the German
lands of the Holy Roman Empire as a consequence of the Western Schism of 1378. Using
data on the granting of market rights in 2,258 cities of the Empire as an indicator of eco-
nomic activity, we find that the rates of market establishment experience a positive break
after the foundation of the first universities in Heidelberg, Cologne and Erfurt. Moreover,
the trend break is most pronounced in the regions that experienced the largest change in
28To our knowledge, this is the first quantitative examination of the work by Alidosi.
29Moreover, as many students of the Middle Ages had taken the minor orders, clerical activities often over-
lapped with secular ones (Moraw, 1992, p. 269).
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distance to the closest university as a consequence of the foundation of the new schools. We
interpret these findings as evidence in favor of a causal effect of university foundation (and
of penetration of Roman legal knowledge) on economic development.
4 Historical Case Study 2: The Introduction of Western Education
in Late Imperial and Republican China
4.1 Traditional Education in China and the Introduction of Western Science
For hundreds of years, the traditional Chinese education system, focused on the study of
the Confucian classics, prepared students to take imperial exams with the goals of achieving
gentry status and receiving a position in the imperial civil service. The traditional education
system was, through its provision of human capital, its transmission of Confucian ideology,
and its selection of social elites, a pillar of imperial China’s social structure, government,
and economy. “In China since medieval times, imperial dynasties, gentry-literati elites, and
classical studies were tightly intertwined in the operation of the civil service examinations.
All three were perpetuated during the late empire (1368–1911), and they stabilized for five
hundred years because of their interdependence” (Elman, 2000, p. xvii).
Students began their studies as young children, typically in schools that were funded by
their clans. After memorizing the thousands of characters comprising the Confucian classics
(which might take over a decade), students would devote yet more time to practicing their
composition skills—most importantly, the “eight-legged essays” on which they were evalu-
ated in the examinations—and reading commentaries and histories that would be useful for
their exams. Advanced study would take place in academies, generally organized and paid
for privately, that prepared students to take civil service exams.
Traditional Chinese education had a remarkably narrow focus: mastery of the Confucian
25
classics and the ability to write the eight-legged essays were almost exclusively the skills that
determined success on the imperial exams in the late Qing Dynasty (Elman, 2000). Students
responded to the incentives offered by the examination system and typically did not seek
broad educations that went beyond the material needed to succeed in the exams. One offi-
cial, a holder of the highest, jinshi, degree in the examinations, “complained privately that
the civil service lacked men with any practical talent because the selection process made
little effort to stress administrative concerns” (Elman, 2000, p. 573). Another official stated
that China’s literati “study things they will never use and later use what they have never
studied” (Elman, 2000, p. 589).
In Table 4, we present some data on the topics about which “policy questions” were
asked in mid-19th century provincial-level exams (the Table is based on figures reported in
Elman, 2000, p. 722). In both 1840 and 1849, topics in the humanities—the Classics, History,
Poetry, and Philology—dominated the exams. In contrast, scientific questions nearly never
appeared: no questions about nature were asked in 1840, across seven provinces’ exams,
and only one such question was asked, across 15 provinces’ exams, in 1849. Even where
questions on more applied topics were assigned, the style of writing, rather than the sub-
stance, was the most important metric by which an exam candidate was judged (Elman,
2000; Chang, 1955).
[Table 4 about here]
Prior to the 19th century, Chinese exposure to European science was extremely limited,
and the gap between Chinese and Western science in the 19th century was massive. Elman
(2006) writes:
By 1750, textbooks made the application of mechanical principles accessible to anyone literate
in English or French, and artisans and engineers applied them. None were translated into Chi-
nese, because the Jesuits [who controlled the transfer of Western science to China in the 18th
26
century] never made the jump to the mathematicization of practical mechanics. . . . By the late
eighteenth century, experimental physics and mechanics had surpassed the use of geometry in
Europe. Meanwhile, however, the Chinese were still using as a basis for mathematical learning
the Ten Mathematical Classics.
In the 19th century, encounters with Western, imperialist powers introduced new fields
of study to China—most notably, modern science, mathematics, and engineering. Mission-
ary schools, some Jesuit and many Protestant, began to teach foreign languages and West-
ern math, science, and engineering in the second half of the 19th century. Military (arsenal)
schools, first established in the 1860s by the Qing government, provided applied training in
Western science and engineering and produced Chinese-language translations of important
books in the natural and applied sciences. A small modern educational hierarchy, includ-
ing high schools and universities (privately funded, and often located in Western-controlled
treaty ports), taught modern subjects as well. Finally, some Chinese students accessed West-
ern knowledge through study abroad; Japan and the United States played important roles
in training Chinese in modern subjects like medicine, engineering, and law.
4.2 The Political Economy of Education Reform in Late Imperial China
In the mid- to late-19th century, military defeats to Western countries in the Opium Wars
and to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War indicated to many Chinese a need for modernization.
Reformers urged military changes, political changes, and especially changes in the structure
and content of education. One Qing dynasty official felt that “the military successes of Meiji
Japan were a model for China and that emulating the Japanese would require expanded ed-
ucation in the sciences and industry” (Elman, 2006, p. 201). The importance of educational
reform was even emphasized by the (Guangxu) Emperor: in 1898, he wrote, “Our scholars
are now without solid and practical education; our artisans are without scientific instruc-
tors; when compared with other countries we soon see how weak we are” (Headland, n.d.,
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p. 116). The narrow focus of the Imperial civil service exams was recognized by political re-
formers in the second half of the 19th century as being particularly problematic. In 1896, for
example, Liang Qi-chao “pointed out the deleterious influence of the civil examinations on
learning. Most candidates would master whatever curriculum was set on the examinations
. . . Hence, curricular reform was mandatory to change the learning habits of literati who
sought public office” (Elman, 2000, p. 598).
Some efforts were made to increase the incentives to study modern educational content.
First, the government enacted policies that reduced the cost of studying Western subjects:
it established military arsenal schools, which provided training in science and engineering;
opened some schools with training in foreign languages and Western subjects; and, sup-
ported the study of Western subjects by sending some students to study in Japan, Europe,
and the United States. In addition, late in the 19th century, attempts were made to introduce
Western subjects into the civil service exams, and so into the traditional schools’ curricu-
lum. In 1898, it seemed that radical educational reform would be implemented during the
“100-days reform,” but conservatives ultimately re-asserted themselves (Karl and Zarrow,
2002).
Throughout the second half of the 19th century, arguments for, and acts of, educational
reform were met by powerful resistance from conservative officials. These officials argued
that the investments in Western education ought to be sharply circumscribed: the goal was
“Self-Strengthening,” which meant preserving the core of Chinese learning and culture by
studying Western subjects only to the extent necessary to prevent being militarily defeated
by foreign powers. There were impassioned defenses of Chinese education. One individual
argued that “For five thousand years the spirit of the sages has continued in China . . . [we]
absolutely must not do as the Japanese, who had dispensed with their own learning in favor
of Western learning” (Weston, 2002, p. 108). Not only were cautious officials concerned
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about the cultural losses stemming from educational reform, but they also saw a threat to
the imperial government, and to their own positions, from the study of Western subjects.
Zhang Zhidong, a government official, argued in the late 19th century that “if [one] want[s]
to strengthen China and preserve Chinese learning, [one] must study Western learning. Yet,
if someone [studies Western learning] without first firmly being rooted in Chinese learning
to cultivate his character, he may become a rebel leader if he has a strong body and a slave
[to the West] if he is weak. He will cause more harm [to society] than a person who knows
nothing about Western learning” (Hon, 2002, p. 89).
Conservative Chinese officials for the most part succeeded in preserving the incentives
to study the Classical curriculum in the traditional education system. Their motivations
varied:
Some were antiquarians; others were by nature skeptical of change. But a large number were
‘corrupt bureaucrats’ (suli) who had a vested interest in preserving the political status quo. In
other words, the conservatives were not as ignorant of China’s problems as many people assumed;
nonetheless, they would do what they could to protect their interests. (Hon, 2002, p. 96)
Conservative bureaucrats’ most effective policies were, first, preserving the material cov-
ered on the civil service exams; second, maintaining the links among the exams, “gentry”
status, and economic rents; and third, limiting the application of Western learning in the
labor force by restricting the activities of modern, Western firms.30
Chinese elites hoping to pass the civil service exams in the last decades of the 19th cen-
tury continued to be evaluated as were their fathers and grandfathers. In practice, the lim-
ited introduction of Western science into the exams had little effect on Chinese elites’ studies:
questions about science were not of great consequence to a candidate’s exam outcomes, and
a successful answer did not depend on a mastery of scientific concepts. An 1889 exam asked
examinees to explain the theories of Darwin and Spencer. Elman (2006, p. 150) writes that
30Of course, limitations on the activity of Western firms were also motivated by a variety of reasons other than
the desire to reduce the returns to Western education.
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“the essays on this topic reveal more ignorance than knowledge concerning Darwin’s expla-
nations about the evolution of life forms. Jiang Tongyin’s prize essay, for example, simply
bluffed its way through the issues—the judges, including [the scholar who wrote the ques-
tion] apparently did not know the difference.” The prize winner himself noted that he had
never seen a translation into Chinese of Darwin’s theories.
The continued emphasis in the exams on Classical learning and stylistic writing might
have had less impact on human capital accumulation if the social and economic returns to
mastering the exams had fallen. This was not the case: Chang (1955) describes the myr-
iad benefits accruing to the “gentry” who were successful in the first set of (local) exams in
the 19th century. First, they enjoyed high social status: “The gentry stood above the large
mass of the commoners and the so-called ‘mean people.’ They dominated the social and
economic life of Chinese communities” (Chang, 1955, p. xiii). They also filled local adminis-
trative positions that were not staffed by the imperial civil servants, and enjoyed exemption
from taxes (in particular the tax on land holdings), and stipends in cash or rice in their years
as students and exam candidates. Perhaps the greatest incentive to study the Classics was
the possibility of a lucrative position in the civil service. Chang (1962) estimates that admin-
istrative secretaries (lower-level members of the gentry) earned good incomes of up to 1,500
taels per year. District level officials, who passed higher level exams, earned 30,000 taels per
year; high-level officials earned 180,000 taels per year—truly massive incomes at the time—
over 100 times the income of a well-off secretary. Gentry members who did not serve in the
imperial civil service could also acquire great wealth by working in fields like tax collection
and in the salt administration.
A final important source of distortions in the market for human capital was indirect:
constraints on Western firms’ activities in China sharply reduced the labor market opportu-
nities available to Chinese who studied Western subjects. For example, the construction of
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railroads, crucial for developing a modern Chinese economy in the first decades of the 20th
century, was nearly never approved by the Qing government throughout the second half
of the 19th century.31 As a result, railroads were practically nonexistent: Ma (2008, p. 360)
notes that there existed only 364 kilometers of railroads in all of China until 1894. Modern
banks, too, were not developed prior to the 20th century, and industrial activity was concen-
trated in the Western-controlled treaty ports; both formal and informal institutions limited
the productivity of modern, industrial firms across China. As such, it is less surprising that
despite the scarcity of modern human capital, graduates of the arsenal schools in the second
half of the 19th century were not especially successful in finding employment (Weston, 2002,
p. 105).
On net, it is clear that the modern schools did not attract the very best away from the
traditional system: Elman (2006, p. 158) writes that elites who studied Western subjects were
“considered marginal because they usually had failed the more prestigious civil examina-
tions.” Chang (1955, p. 204) writes that until late in the 19th century, studying Western sub-
jects was “shameful.” In contrast, competition in the imperial exams was extremely intense
in the second half of the 19th century: Elman (2000) presents evidence suggesting “gradu-
ation rates” of well below 10% at different examination levels; Chang (1955, p. 179) quotes
Xue Fu-cheng as saying that in the late 1800s, the traditional education system “drove sev-
eral hundred thousands to several millions of scholars to exhaust their physical and mental
energy in the formalized writings.”
The Qing government clearly viewed modern, Western subjects with some ambivalence.
On the one hand, the study of modern science and engineering could support the state by
improving military technology; indeed, it is clear that 19th-century Chinese reformers, in
the notation of our model, expected pih > 0. On the other hand, the study of the traditional
31Rawski (1989, p. 225) writes that “British observers recalled the 1920s as a period remarkable for ‘the number
of mills and factories of all kinds which were springing up all along the principal railway lines.’”
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curriculum was linked to the selection of social elites and bureaucrats for centuries; ques-
tioning the curriculum implied questioning the qualifications of the social and political elite,
as well as undermining the Confucian ideology that linked the Manchurian Qing dynasty
to its Han subjects and legitimized the imperial bureaucracy. Conservative officials, and in-
fluential conservatives within the imperial household (notably, the Empress Dowager Cixi)
felt that any investment in modern human capital beyond what was absolutely necessary
to modernize the military was a grave threat to their positions of power (pih < 0). Thus,
although the government slightly reduced the direct cost of studying modern subjects (by
establishing some modern schools), the opportunity cost of studying modern subjects was
kept artificially high by reserving massive social and economic rents to those who stud-
ied the traditional curriculum. The expected returns to studying modern subjects were also
made lower and more uncertain by Qing policies restricting the activities of firms that would
find modern human capital most useful. As our model suggests, a government threatened
by investment in a new form of human capital distorted the costs and benefits of that invest-
ment and effectively discouraged it (δ∗ < 0). The result, as one would expect, was limited
acquisition of the new skills.
4.3 Modern Education and Growth: Evidence from Early 20th Century China
China’s economic development in the second half of the 19th century was not impressive:
outside the Western-controlled treaty ports, China did not modernize economically or insti-
tutionally; the Qing government continually faced conflicts, both internal and external, and
pressure for institutional reform. In 1905, the system of imperial exams was abolished and a
modern school system established; the decline of traditional institutions continued, and the
last Qing emperor abdicated in 1912.
It is difficult to know whether different policy choices by the Qing government could
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have encouraged greater investment in modern human capital in the second half of the
19th century, and even more difficult to know whether this might have had consequences
for China’s economic development.32 We present evidence from the period immediately
following the downfall of the Qing Empire that can provide some suggestive answers to
these questions.
First, different government policies very likely would have encouraged greater invest-
ment in modern human capital. Yan (2007) finds that the number of advanced students en-
rolled in modern schools (high schools or universities) increased from under 150,000 in 1912
to well over 500,000 in 1930. The economic environment in Republican China was far from
perfect—the 1910s and 1920s were times of internal conflict across China—but the Repub-
lican government encouraged modern industry and certainly did not promote a traditional
education system. Eliminating the rents associated with traditional study and allowing the
development of modern industry was enough to dramatically increase the number of indi-
viduals studying modern subjects.
There also exists evidence suggesting that investments in modern human capital could
have promoted economic development in imperial China. Bai and Kung (2011) present ev-
idence that Chinese counties with more Protestant missionaries were more urbanized (and
thus plausibly more developed) than other counties in the early 20th century. Importantly,
the channel through which missionaries affected urbanization seems to have been the trans-
mission of Western knowledge: it was particularly the presence of missionaries from de-
nominations involved in school and hospital construction that was associated with greater
urbanization.
An early 20th century directory of individuals who had returned to China from study
32Lin (1995) and Huff (2003) argue that China’s traditional education system was a hindrance to technolog-
ical progress for centuries, as it diverted elites’ attention away from scientific discovery. The question here is
whether China would have more effectively adopted Western technology and modernized its economy, rather
than indigenously innovated new technologies.
33
in America provides an indication of the usefulness to modern firms of the human capital
provided by Western schools. The directory first notes (perhaps with some exaggeration)
that “[I]t does not seem possible to give an adequate estimate of what the [returned] students
as a whole have done for their country. But probably it is within the bounds of safety as
well as propriety to say that it has been entirely due to their efforts and influence that the
country is being modernized” (Tsinghua University, 1917). In Table 5, the sectors in which
these individuals were employed in 1917 are summarized. It is clear that many of them were
able to use their human capital in modern industries like the railroads and mining; in white
collar positions, like banking; and in practicing medicine; many also found employment as
officials in the Republican government.
[Table 5 about here]
Examining individual-level data, Yuchtman (2010) finds that in the 1920s, the Tianjin-
Pukou Railroad paid extremely high wages to individuals who were trained at high levels
in modern schools, especially those trained as engineers. Traditionally-educated workers
earned wage premiums relative to unskilled workers, but significantly lower wages than
the engineers. This suggests that individuals who studied modern subjects, especially engi-
neering, were differentially productive in the railroads. Greater investment in modern hu-
man capital thus might have supported the establishment and growth of modern, industrial
firms in 19th century China. In addition, had the Qing government not limited the devel-
opment of Chinese railroads and other industries, there might have existed greater demand
for individuals trained in modern schools, and thus greater investment in the new forms
of human capital. Historical evidence thus suggests that a consequence of Qing policies in-
centivizing the study of traditional subjects was under-investment in productive, modern
human capital, and consequently, delayed economic modernization.
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5 Educational Content, Institutions, and Growth: Additional Ap-
plications of the Model
The two historical cases discussed above illustrate how our simple model can inform the
study of investments in human capital and their relation to growth. We believe that these
insights can be applied still more broadly to a variety of additional historical and present-
day settings. Here we briefly discuss several of these, and then examine cross-country data
on education and growth through the lens of our model.
5.1 Historical and Modern Cases
The rise and fall of Islamic science represented part of an epochal shift in the wealth and
power of the civilizations of the West, and have received the attention of many scholars.
Chaney (2008) presents an analysis along the lines suggested by our model: Islamic elites
who controlled educational institutions in the Middle Ages initially promoted the study of
logic and science, because the gains from spreading these skills (more converts to Islam)
outweighed the drawbacks (potential criticism of the established religious elites). Using the
language of our model, as Islam spread, elites perceived ∂pi∂h > 0. This period of elite support
for scientific study saw the flourishing of Islamic society. As Islam succeeded in conquering
and converting the vast majority of the populations in the Middle East, the gains to elites
from people’s investments in the study of logic and science fell relative to the costs, and
elites moved to prevent the further study of these subjects (over time, ∂pi∂h became negative).
Unsurprisingly, with elites moving to prevent the study of science, Islam fell behind, ceding
its scientific preeminence to Europe.
England around the time of the Industrial Revolution presents another fascinating case.
At first glance, one might believe that this was a case of growth without proper educational
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institutions or content. Smith (1776, book V, ch. 1) famously said of Oxford professors that
“the greater part of [them] have, for these many years, given up altogether the pretence
of teaching.” University students in the 19th century focused their studies on the classics
and history—much like the Chinese literati of the same period. On the other hand, edu-
cational institutions, broadly defined, were far more open in 18th and 19th century Britain
than in China. Mitch (1999) and Mokyr (2005) provide many examples of sources of scien-
tific knowledge that were available throughout Britain: from new (“Red Brick”) universities
established in the 19th century with a more applied slant than Oxbridge, to lectures, scien-
tific society meetings, mechanics’ institutes, and more. Viewed in light of our model, one
can see that the British elite, for all of the distortions they imposed on a variety of sectors, did
not prevent broad segments of the population from acquiring scientific knowledge, nor did
they greatly distort the labor market returns to its acquisition. With a value of δ∗ close to 0,
individuals invested in acquiring scientific knowledge that drove the Industrial Revolution.
The emergence of the modern research university in the 19th century is another example
that might fit well within our theoretical framework. With the changes inspired by the
Humboldtian ideal of teaching and research, German universities were restructured in a
manner complementary to the challenges of the rapid technological changes of the 19th
century (Lenoir, 1998). Those changes in the structure of higher education were, in turn,
the result of Prussia’s critical reexamination of its institutions after its defeat at the hands
of Napoleonic France: Prussia’s reformers realized that ∂pi∂h > 0. A similar, positive reaction
in the structure of higher education can be observed in American universities, which were
geared toward a stronger research focus in the early 20th century (Goldin and Katz, 1999;
Goldin, 2001).
Moving forward in time, the 20th century is full of cases of governments implementing
policies affecting educational content, driven by political economy concerns. One dramatic
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instance was the passage of the National Defense Education Act in the United States in 1958.
In this case, government support for scientific education was massively increased following
the successful launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite by the Soviet Union. Here, the government
became aware that ∂pi∂h > 0, where h in this case specifically represents scientific knowledge.
The example reveals another angle of the political economy problem governments face: the
U.S. elite was threatened by Sputnik both because the population of the U.S. evaluated the
government according to its standing relative to the Soviet Union (hence, there existed some
internal political incentives), and because there was a plausible external threat to the elites if
Soviet technology became too advanced.
Today, one again sees a concerted effort made by governments to support the study of
science and math. In his weekly address of February 19, 2011, Barack Obama proclaimed,
“If we want to win the global competition for new jobs and industries, we’ve got to win the
global competition to educate our people. We’ve got to have the best trained, best skilled
workforce in the world. That’s how we’ll ensure that the next Intel, the next Google, or the
next Microsoft is created in America, and hires American workers.” To indicate the direction
in which he thinks education should move, he continues: “[Intel] is providing training to
help 100,000 math and science teachers improve their skills in the classroom. And today, I’m
also meeting a few students from Oregon who impressed the judges in the high school sci-
ence and engineering competitions that Intel sponsors across America.”33 The government
of the United Kingdom, while cutting educational expenditures dramatically in 2010, did
not cut spending in “STEM” subjects, i.e. science, technology, engineering, and maths (Mor-
gan, 2010). In these cases, it appears that the purpose of efforts to promote specific fields of
study is simply to increase individuals’ incomes (and reduce unemployment rates)—which,
of course, also typically leads to greater support for the existing elite in democratic societies.
33The full text of the address, titled “To Win the Future, America Must Win the Global Competition in Educa-
tion,” is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-and-releases.
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5.2 A Look at Contemporary Data
To illustrate how our theoretical framework can be applied to understand the political econ-
omy nexus between human capital investments and economic growth in the modern world,
we turn to contemporary cross-country data. Guided by our model, we first try to identify
whether, on average, particular types of educational content appear to be associated with
more rapid economic growth in recent decades. Then, we explore whether the relation-
ships between specific types of human capital and growth depend on a country’s political
institutions—which proxy for a government’s incentives to distort the returns to human
capital. This exercise will not allow us to identify causal relationships in the data, but will
provide some indication of the importance of political institutions in mediating the relation-
ship between particular types of human capital and growth.
As an indicator of differences across countries in the content of individuals’ schooling,
we use UNESCO data on tertiary education enrollments by field of study between 1998 and
2010.34 We focus on the fraction of individuals enrolled in engineering programs and in
social science, business and law programs (we shorten this to “business or law” hereafter,
for brevity), both of which plausibly provide skills that are valuable in modern economies.
In the spirit of Murphy et al. (1991), we begin by regressing growth rates of GDP per
capita over the 2000–2008 period on the average fraction of tertiary students enrolled in en-
gineering programs and on the fraction of students enrolled in business or law, including
standard controls for country characteristics used in cross-country analyses (see Table 6, col-
34Two caveats regarding these data should be mentioned. First, the enrollment data used are only from very
recent years, while income growth will typically be determined by the existing stock of individuals’ human
capital, much of which was accumulated in prior years. We expect that current flows of human capital are a fair
proxy for previous investments, but they are surely imperfect. Second, because data are typically not available
for every country in every year, we construct a country’s average share of tertiary-level students enrolled in
different fields using the average values for all available years between 1998–2010, for countries with tertiary
enrollments of 10,000 or more. These averages across several years are only noisy indicators of the human
capital that individuals have acquired.
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umn 1).35 We find a positive and significant correlation between enrollment in engineering
and GDP per capita growth rates; in contrast, the fraction of students enrolled in the fields of
business or law has no effect.36 The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that an increase of
one standard deviation in the fraction of students enrolled in engineering is associated with
an increase of average per capita GDP growth by 6.91 · 0.101 = 0.698 percentage points,
slightly less than one third of a standard deviation.
[Table 6 about here]
We next examine whether our findings are similar even after controlling for the quality
of political institutions. We choose the “Polity IV” score as our measure of institutions;
higher levels correspond to higher degrees of democracy.37 The results in column 2 are very
similar to the ones in the previous regression setup, suggesting that the positive association
of engineering training with growth was not simply due to a correlation between a country’s
institutions and students’ enrollment choices.
Our model suggests that if a particular type of human capital content is unproductive,
it still may be acquired in countries where educational investment decisions are distorted
by government policies. Thus, estimating models in which the impact of enrollment shares
on growth is restricted to be equal for countries with more and less distorted returns to
human capital might cause us to miss the true effects of specific types of human capital.
Here, we propose that a state’s institutions (i.e., its Polity score) can be used as a proxy for
governments’ incentives to distort the costs and benefits of investing in specific educational
content. We next examine the interaction between political institutions and human capital
35Summary statistics and details on sources of all variables are presented in A.
36All other categories of tertiary education listed in the UNESCO statistics also show no significant correlation
with growth rates over 2000–2008, with the exception of enrollments in health sciences, which are negatively
correlated.
37The Polity IV score is normalized between −10 (perfect autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy).
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investments, allowing the relationship between investments in human capital and growth
to differ between more and less democratic countries.
Interestingly, we find that investment in business or law training seems to be positively
associated with growth in countries with more democratic institutions: the interaction term
between the share of enrollments in business or law studies and the Polity score is positive
and marginally significant (column 3). In very democratic countries, more business or law
training is associated with growth; the reverse is true in non-democracies. This suggests
that individuals’ investments in these skills are much more socially productive in societies
in which government elites have less incentive to distort markets for human capital.
We finally examine whether enrollment shares in engineering and business or law are
strongly associated with a country’s political institutions. The results in columns 4 and 5
suggest that there is no clear relationship between the Polity score and the study of engi-
neering or of business or law. This suggests that individuals in less democratic countries
pursue social science, business, and law training despite relatively low social returns (i.e.,
growth): there seems to be a wedge between the private rate of return and the social rate
of return to this particular form of human capital in these countries. A possible explanation
for this finding is that more democratic states offer greater opportunities for entrepreneurial
activity, and thus high private and social returns to studying in these fields, whereas less
democratic societies offer more rent-seeking opportunities, and thus high private, but low
social, returns to their study. Engineering training, on the other hand, is associated with
growth across regimes; thus, it is not surprising that there is no significant difference in av-
erage enrollment rates depending on the Polity score—present-day data show little evidence
in favor of distortion of the returns to engineering training across countries.
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6 Conclusion
Development economists have long viewed variation in educational attainment across coun-
tries as an important factor determining the wealth of nations (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992).
There has been far less discussion among economists of the importance of differences in the
content of education across countries. We argue that specific educational content can play
an important role in economic development and that government policies play a crucial role
in determining incentives to acquire different skills. Governments can play a salutary role,
overcoming market failures that make individual investment levels sub-optimal, or they can
play a damaging role, in pursuit of their own interest in maintaining power.
We have presented a simple model that makes clear how individual choices and gov-
ernments’ incentives interact in producing an equilibrium level of investment in a specific
form of human capital. To illustrate the mechanisms of the model in historically important
contexts, we have closely examined two cases to establish a tighter link among government
policy, investments in particular types of human capital, and consequences for economic
activity. These cases make clear that a new, productive form of human capital will only be
invested in when governments do not discourage investment, and when governments act
to reduce the uncertainty individuals face in choosing their fields of study. Indeed, govern-
ment encouragement of investment (through institutional changes or through intervention
in the labor market) can be crucial to ensuring that individuals choose to acquire new skills
in a situation characterized by uncertain returns to the new technology.
We view our work on the content of education and the work in this volume on the qual-
ity of education as important complements to development research that has focused on
quantities of human capital almost exclusively. Further study of educational content and in-
stitutions as crucial determinants of human capital in a society, and thus growth, appear to
be an important, under-explored area of study. In addition, the content of education shapes
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not only productive capacities, but also ideology, providing an additional political economy
dimension to government policies toward human capital provision. We plan to pursue these
areas of research in the future.
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Table 1: Educational Content Across Countries
Country Share Business or Law Country Share Engineering
1. Bahrain 58.2 1. Republic of Korea 31.9
2. Mali 58.1 2. Colombia 30.2
3. Cameroon 57.9 3. Singapore 29.5
4. Cambodia 54.7 4. Iran 28.6
5. Latvia 51.4 5. Finland 25.7
83. Kenya 21.3 83. Cambodia 3.0
84. Republic of Korea 21.0 84. Mali 2.2
85. Libya 18.3 85. Cuba 1.8
86. Iraq 15.3 86. Niger 1.6
87. Saudi Arabia 14.4 87. Congo 1.0
Note: Variable definitions and sources in A.
Table 2: Numbers of Universities
Italy France British Isles Iberia H.R. Empire Other Europe
1200 2 1 1 0 0 0
1250 7 2 2 2 0 0
1300 7 3 2 3 0 0
1350 10 8 2 5 0 0
1400 12 9 2 6 5 1
1450 14 14 3 6 8 2
1500 13 17 5 11 15 5
Numbers of universities active in each given year. Source: Rashdall (1895).
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Table 3: Careers of Bologna Graduates in Law
Career Number % of sample
Church (clergy) 478 39.44
Among these: Canons (195), bishops (94),
archdeacons (31), abbots (30), . . .
Church Administration 381 31.44
Among these: officials of the Inquisition (86),
Protonotaries Apostolic (84), auditors at the Rota
(37), . . .
Academia 91 7.51
Among these: lecturers (56), glossators (15), pre-
ceptors (10), . . .
Public Administration 262 21.62
Among these: governors (91), podesta` (40), sen-
ators of the city of Bologna (36), . . .
Source: Own tabulations based on Alidosi (1623).
Table 4: Topics of Policy Questions in Qing Dynasty Provincial-level Exams
Topic Fraction of Provinces Including
Policy Question on Topic
1840 1849
Classical Studies 77.78 100.00
History 77.78 93.33
Learning/Selection 77.78 40.00
Literature/Poetry 55.56 26.67
Geography 55.56 53.33
Economy/Statecraft 44.44 73.33
Philology 44.44 40.00
Agriculture 22.22 6.67
World-ordering 11.11 6.67
Law 11.11 13.33
Military Matters 11.11 6.67
Pre-Han Masters 11.11 6.67
Nature 0.00 6.67
Local Governance 0.00 26.67
Notes: Table based on exam questions from 9 provincial ex-
ams in 1840 and 15 exams in 1849. Each provincial exam
included 5 policy questions. Source: based on Table 8.8 in
Elman (2000).
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Table 5: Careers of Chinese Students Returned from Study in America
Career Number % of sample
Government officials 24 20.00
Academics 30 25.00
Among these: Faculty (14), Administrators (4),
Librarian (1), . . .
Engineering and Industry 40 33.33
Among these: Railroads (16), Mining (6), Iron
and Steel Production (4), Petroleum (3), , . . .
Medical Doctors 11 9.17
Banking and Law 8 6.67
Among these: Bankers (5), Lawyers (3).
Other fields 7 5.83
Among these: Social work (3), Agriculture (1), . . .
Source: Own tabulations based on Tsinghua University (1917).
Table 6: Educational Content and Growth
Dependent Variable Average GDP p.c. Share Share
Growth, 2000–2008 Engineering Business or Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Engineering 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.110**
[0.034] [0.033] [0.047]
Share Engineering · Polity IV -0.002
[0.006]
Share Business or Law 0.038 0.040 0.036
[0.030] [0.031] [0.030]
Share Business or Law · Polity IV 0.006*
[0.003]
Polity IV score -0.018 -0.216 0.127 0.456
[0.045] [0.156] [0.149] [0.310]
Years of schooling 0.642*** 0.654*** 0.706*** -0.006 -0.807
[0.137] [0.140] [0.144] [0.395] [0.486]
log(GDP p.c.) -1.475*** -1.454*** -1.447*** 1.408 -1.734
[0.312] [0.322] [0.325] [0.894] [1.327]
Constant 8.477*** 8.165** 7.745** -0.549 55.229***
[3.056] [3.164] [3.116] [5.847] [9.017]
Observations 87 87 87 87 87
Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.279 0.296 0.083 0.110
Notes: *: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets. Years of Schooling,
log(GDP p.c.) and the Polity IV score refer to the beginning of the time period considered. Variable
definitions and sources in A.
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A Data Description
A.1 Variables definitions and sources
Variable Description
Avg. GDP p.c. Growth Average (logarithmic) growth rate of PPP Converted GDP per capita
(chain series), at 2005 constant prices (in %). Source: Penn World
Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011).
Share Engineering Tertiary education enrollment in engineering, manufacturing and
construction programs, as a fraction of total tertiary education en-
rollment (in %). Average over all available years (maximum range:
1998–2010). Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Share Business or Law Tertiary education enrollment in social sciences, business and law, as
a fraction of total tertiary education enrollment (in %). Average over
all available years (maximum range: 1998–2010). Source: UNESCO
Institute for Statistics.
Years of schooling Average years of schooling at the beginning of the period con-
sidered, from Barro and Lee (2010). Dataset available at
http://www.barrolee.com/.
log(GDP p.c.) Logarithm of PPP Converted GDP per capita (chain series), at 2005
constant prices, at the beginning of the period considered. Source:
Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011).
Polity IV score polity2 score at the beginning of the period considered, from
the Polity IV dataset, version 2010. Dataset available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
A.2 Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Average GDP p.c. Growth, 2000–2008 87 3.23 2.46 -3.52 10.07
Share Engineering 87 13.07 6.91 0.95 31.85
Share Business or Law 87 35.94 9.69 14.39 58.20
Polity IV score, 2000 87 5.32 5.73 -10 10
Years of Schooling, 2000 87 7.87 2.68 1.05 12.71
log(GDP p.c.), 2000 87 8.79 1.29 5.98 10.71
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